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Over time the international development community has advocated various devel-
opment paradigms, but countries following these paradigms have often performed
poorly. I provide an explanation for this poor performance. In my model the po-
litical leader of a developing country chooses a policy and whether to implement it
in an honest or corrupt manner. These choices aﬀect domestic production and aid
inﬂows. Production is high when productive capacity is high, and when the policy
is appropriate in the country-speciﬁc circumstances and implemented honestly. Aid
inﬂows are high when the policy is close to the paradigm. In equilibrium countries
with low productive capacity and high corruption resulting from weak political insti-
tutions follow the paradigm more closely. Hence my model suggests that development
paradigms have a tendency to fail because they are primarily followed by countries
that would fail anyway.
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11 Introduction
Development economists and international development agencies have advocated very dif-
ferent development paradigms since World War II. The paradigm of the 1950s and 1960s
suggested that governments should take the leading role in development: they should adopt
import substitution policies and plan the accumulation and allocation of capital. But
Krueger (1995) and others argue that many developing countries following this paradigm,
for example those in Latin America, performed rather poorly, while some other countries
like South Korea and Taiwan were growing fast with diﬀerent policies.
The paradigm of the 1980s and 1990s, the “Washington Consensus”, suggested that
markets should be given the leading role in development: industries should be deregulated,
public enterprizes privatized and trade liberalized. But Rodrik (2006) and others argue
that many developing countries following this paradigm, for example again those in Latin
America, performed rather poorly despite the support they received from international
development agencies, while some other countries like China and India were growing fast
with diﬀerent policies.1
Besides these two major development paradigms, many other ideas and paradigms have
also been far less successful in promoting economic development than initially expected.
Reviewing various development policies popular at some point in time since World War
II, Easterly (2001, book cover) concludes that “[a] myriad of remedies has not delivered
the solutions promised.” The limited success of the various development paradigms also
manifests itself in the disappointing ﬁnding that foreign aid has no robust positive eﬀect
on economic development (e.g., Rajan and Subramanian, 2008).
The question arises way all these development paradigms have failed in various coun-
tries. In principle, it could be that all these paradigms were wrong, but that there is a
1The success of these two major development paradigms is subject to an intense and sometimes ideology-
laden discussion. For a thorough and insightful discussion, see, e.g., Lindauer and Pritchett (2002).
2“true” development paradigm out there waiting to be discovered. However, many develop-
ment economists have recently emphasized that it is unlikely that a simple set of policies
can trigger development universally, and that appropriate policies diﬀer across countries
as they depend on cultural, historical and institutional circumstances (e.g., Lindauer and
Pritchett, 2002; Mukand and Rodrik, 2005; Rodrik, 2006, 2007, 2010; Rajan 2008).2 In
this paper I take the notion that appropriate policies diﬀer across developing countries as
a starting point, and I show that countries that would preform poorly anyway because of
their poor economic and institutional pre-conditions tend to follow development paradigms
more closely. This argument suggests that development paradigms have a tendency to fail
because they attract countries that would fail anyway.
I present my argument using a simple two-period political economy model inspired by
Mukand and Rodrik (2005), and Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2010). I follow the former
in modeling country-speciﬁc optimal policies and corruption, and the latter in modeling
political competition and institutions.3 In my model the incumbent president of a devel-
oping country chooses a policy, e.g., the degree of government interventions, and decides
whether to implement this policy in an honest or corrupt manner. These choices aﬀect
the two components of national income: domestic production and aid inﬂows. Domestic
production is high when productive capacity is high, and when the policy is appropriate in
the country-speciﬁc circumstances and implemented in an honest manner. Aid inﬂows are
high when the policy is close to the current development paradigm. At the end of the ﬁrst
period the incumbent may be replaced by the challenger. The chances that the incumbent
can stay in oﬃce depend on the quality of the political institutions, and on whether the
people support him or his challenger, knowing that any politician could be inherently good
2The theory of the second best suggests that optimal policies should diﬀer across developing countries
if binding constraints diﬀer across developing countries, which seems likely.
3The foci of these two contributions are quite diﬀerent from mine: Mukand and Rodrik (2005) study
policy experimentation and imitation in a setting with multiple countries, and Bhattacharyya and Hodler
(2010) look at how the eﬀect of natural resource rents on corruption depends on political institutions.
3(i.e., benevolent) or bad (i.e., corrupt). In the second period the politician in oﬃce again
chooses a policy and decides whether to implement it in an honest or corrupt manner.
In equilibrium the people support the incumbent if and only if he chooses the optimal
policy and implements it in an honest manner. A good incumbent always does so, but a
bad incumbent does so only if the political institutions are suﬃciently strong, such that
he is likely to stay in oﬃce if and only if the people decide to support him. If the political
institutions are relatively weak, a bad incumbent chooses a policy closer to the paradigm
and implements it in a corrupt manner. Moreover, the chosen policy is in any case the closer
to the paradigm, the lower the productive capacity. Hence countries that would perform
poorly anyway due low productivity and high corruption resulting from weak political
institutions tend to follow the paradigm more closely than countries with high productivity
and no corruption. In an extension I further show that if the paradigm reveals some
information about the policies that could be appropriate, then ignorant politicians follow
the paradigm more closely than politicians who know the appropriate policy themselves.
Therefore development paradigms may be doomed to fail because they attract countries
that are doomed to fail.
This model also provides an explanation for the absence of a robust positive eﬀect of
foreign aid on economic development. It suggests that countries receive more aid when
following the paradigm closely, and that such countries tend to be plagued by low pro-
ductivity, weak political institutions and distorted policies that are inappropriate in the
country-speciﬁc circumstances.
There are many contributions that argue why some particular development paradigm
has failed. But to the best of my knowledge, my model is the ﬁrst that oﬀers an explanation
why all development paradigms have a tendency to fail or, at least, to look as if they failed.
It is thereby related to other models that illustrate the (mostly negative) incentive eﬀects
of foreign aid, e.g., those on foreign aid and rent seeking by Svensson (2000) and Hodler
4(2007). The most closely related contributions is probably Hagen (2008) showing that aid
recipient countries have an incentive to tilt their policies towards the donors’ preferred
policies (i.e., towards the current paradigm) even if aid is disbursed unconditionally.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium and derives the main results. Section 4 introduces
uncertainty into the model. Section 5 concludes. The appendix contains lengthy proofs.
2 The Model
There is a developing country with three players: the incumbent president, who is in power
for exogenous reasons, a challenger and the people. Each politician, i.e., the incumbent and
the challenger, is a good type with probability β 2 (0,1) and a bad type with probability
1   β.4 Each politician’s type is his private information, but β is common knowledge.
There are two periods t = 1,2. Timing and actions are as follows: In period one
the incumbent chooses policy a1 2 [0,1] and the level of corruption κ1 2 f0,cg, where
0 represents absence of corruption and c considerable corruption, and where c 2 (0,1).
At the end of period one, the people observe κ1, but not a1, and they support either the
incumbent or the challenger.5 I assume that they support the incumbent when indiﬀerent.
The political institutions determine the extent to which the people’s decision aﬀects the
probability that the incumbent is replaced by the challenger. The incumbent can remain
in oﬃce with probability p if the people support him, and with probability q if the people
support the challenger, where 0  q  p  1. Following Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2010),
I measure the quality of the political institutions by D  p   q. This measure suggests
that political institutions are of high quality when the incumbent is likely to stay in oﬃce
4The subsequent results hold for any  2 (0;1), i.e., even if good politicians are rare.
5The assumption that the people do not observe a1 is not crucial, but simpliﬁes the analysis by reducing
the number of possible oﬀ equilibrium observations.
5if and only if the people want him to stay, but of low quality when the people’s decision
has little eﬀect on the chances that the incumbent can stay in oﬃce.6 In period two the
politician in oﬃce chooses policy a2 2 [0,1] and corruption κ2 2 f0,cg.
In each period there are two sources of national income yt: domestic production and
aid inﬂows. Domestic production increases in the productive capacity A > 0; and due to
disincentive eﬀects it is lower in the presence of corruption (κt = c) than in the absence of
it (κt = 0). Domestic production also depends on how close the chosen policy at is to the
policy z 2 [0,1] that maximizes production in the country-speciﬁc circumstances. For now,
I assume that politicians know z.7 Aid inﬂows depend on the donors’ generosity B > 0 and
the closeness of policy at to the development paradigm x 2 [0,1]. The idea is that donors
reward aid recipient countries that follow the current paradigm, either by allocating (i.e.,
promising) more aid to these countries, or by disbursing a higher fraction of the allocated
aid to these countries.8 Formally, I assume
yt = y(at,κt)  Λ(κt)f(atjz) + Bg(atjx), (1)
where Λ(0) = A and Λ(c) = ϕA with A > 0 and ϕ 2 (0,1), and where f(atjz) and g(atjx)
are strictly positive and continuously diﬀerentiable with f′ > 0 if at < z, f′ < 0 if at > z,
f′′ < 0, g′ > 0 if at < x, g′ < 0 if at > x, and g′′ < 0.
The choices of the politician in oﬃce determine his oﬃcial wage wt = w(at,κt) =
τy(at,κt), where τ 2 (0,1 c), his corruption revenues rt = r(at,κt) = κty(at,κt), and the
6Aidt et al. (2008) also use this measure of political institutions in their retrospective voting framework.
They focus on the two diﬀerent types of weak political institutions that this formulation allows for: If p and
q are both high, an authoritarian incumbent is likely to stay in oﬃce even without the people’s support.
If they are both low, the incumbent is likely to be overthrown even when the people support him.
7The subsequent results do not depend on whether or not the people know z.
8The model can therefore capture a main determinant of aid ﬂows even if aid conditionality rarely
works, as long as more aid is generally allocated to countries following the current development paradigm
than to countries choosing very diﬀerent policies (e.g., central planning in the early 1990s). See also Hagen
(2008).
6people’s welfare ut = u(at,κt) = (1 τ  κt)y(at,κt). In each period the people’s payoﬀ is
ut, the payoﬀ of a good politician in oﬃce is wt, the payoﬀ of a bad politician in oﬃce is
wt + rt, and the payoﬀ of a politician out of oﬃce is zero. Hence good and bad politicians
diﬀer in that bad politicians value corruption revenues and the oﬃcial wage equally, while
good politicians only derive utility from their oﬃcial wage. For simplicity, I abstract from
discounting. Further, I assume τ
c <
ϕ
1−ϕ to rule out the uninteresting case in which even
bad politicians always choose zero corruption (see Proof of Lemma 2).
The appropriate solution concept for my dynamic game of incomplete information is
perfect Bayesian equilibria, and I focus on pure-strategy equilibria that satisfy the Cho-
Kreps intuitive criterion. I use the abbreviation PBE to stand for perfect Bayesian equi-
libria in pure strategies that satisfy the intuitive criterion.
3 The Equilibrium
I start by discussing the combinations of policies at and corruption κt that a politician in
oﬃce may choose. As the payoﬀ of any politician in oﬃce increases in the national income
yt, any politician sets at to maximize yt given his choice of κt 2 f0,cg. Hence he chooses
either κt = 0 and at = a0, or κt = c and at = ac, where aκt  argmaxat y(at,κt). These
choices lead to the national income yt = y0 or yt = yc, respectively, where yκt  y(aκt,κt).
Obviously, y0 > yc. The following lemma further provides some useful results on aκt:
Lemma 1 It holds that minfx,zg  aκt  maxfx,zg, that the distance jaκt  xj increases
in A and decreases in B, and that ja0   xj > jac   xj.
That is, politicians always choose a policy in-between the production maximizing policy z
and the aid maximizing paradigm x. The chosen policy is closer to the paradigm in the
presence of corruption, and if the country’s productive capacity A is low. The reason is
that in these cases productivity is low anyway, such that more can be gained by appealing
7to international donors than by choosing policies that slightly increase productivity in the
country-speciﬁc circumstances.
I now solve the game using backward induction, therefore starting with the policy
choices of the politician who is in oﬃce in period two:
Lemma 2 In period two a good politician in oﬃce chooses κ2 = 0 and a2 = a0, and a bad
politician in oﬃce chooses κ2 = c and a2 = ac.
A good politician prefers zero corruption and chooses policy a0, because corruption would
lower domestic production and thereby his wage w2. A bad politician chooses corruption
κ2 = c and policy ac, because the share c + τ of the national income y2 = yc that he gets
when acting corruptly exceeds the share τ of y2 = y0 that constitutes his wage when acting
honestly.
It follows from Lemma 2 that in period two the people’s welfare is u2 = (1   τ)y0 if a
good politician is in oﬃce, and u2 = (1 τ c)yc if a bad politician is in oﬃce. Since y0 > yc
and c > 0, the people are clearly better oﬀ in period two when the politician in oﬃce is
good rather than bad. Hence, at the end of period one, they support the incumbent if and
only if their belief that he is a good type, which I denote by µ(κ1), exceeds probability β,
with which the challenger is a good type. Their belief µ(κ1) depends on their observation
κ1 and the equilibrium strategies of good and bad incumbents. Let us assume that a good
incumbent chooses the national income maximizing policy bundle (a0,0) also in period one.
(Proposition 1 below conﬁrms that a good politician chooses (a0,0) in any PBE.) A bad
incumbent then faces a trade-oﬀ: He can either play (a0,0) to imitate a good incumbent,
or he can reveal his bad type by acting corruptly. In this latter case he is best oﬀ when
choosing the policy bundle (ac,c). For a bad incumbent imitation has the advantage that it
improves the chances that he can stay in oﬃce, while revealing his type has the advantage
that he can earn corruption revenues already in period one. In particular, imitation leads
to an expected lifetime payoﬀ of τy0+p(τ +c)yc, and revealing his type and playing (ac,c)
8to an expected lifetime payoﬀ of (1 + q)(τ + c)yc. Hence imitation makes him better oﬀ if
and only if D  D′ 
(τ+c)yc−τy0
(τ+c)yc . It follows:
Proposition 1 There exists a PBE in which a good incumbent chooses κ1 = 0 and a1 = a0,
and a bad incumbent chooses κ1 = 0 and a1 = a0 if D  D′, but κ1 = c and a1 = ac
otherwise; and in which the people support the incumbent if and only if they observe κ1 = 0.
The threshold D′ satisﬁes D′ 2 (0,1), increases in B and ϕ, and decreases in A. There
exist no other PBE.
Proposition 1 highlights that a bad incumbent imitates the national income maximizing
policies of a good incumbent in period one if the political institutions are strong, such
that he is likely to stay in oﬃce when supported by the people, but unlikely to stay
without the people’s support. However, he chooses the same corrupted policies as in
period two when the political institutions are weak, such that the people’s decision has
little impact on the chances that he can remain in oﬃce. More generous aid inﬂows (higher
B) makes corruption relatively more attractive and, therefore, increases the threshold level
D′. Higher productive capacity A and larger disincentive eﬀects of corruption (lower ϕ)
have the opposite eﬀect: They make corruption less attractive and, therefore, reduce D′.
Having derived the equilibrium strategies, we can now study the characteristics of the
countries that tend to follow the paradigm closely. I thereby use the expected distance
E(ja1   xj) to measure how closely a country follows the paradigm. Proposition 1 implies
that the expected distance is simply E(ja1   xj) = ja0   xj if political institutions are so
strong that D  D′, but E(ja1 xj) = βja0 xj+(1 β)jac xj otherwise. It then directly
follows from Lemma 1:
Proposition 2 The expected distance E(ja1  xj) increases in A and decreases in B, and
it is higher if D  D′ than otherwise.
9In other words, developing countries tend to follow the paradigm closely if productive
capacity A is low, if aid tends to be generous (high B), and if political institutions D are
so weak that bad incumbents do not feel suﬃciently constrained to refrain from corruption.
It is easy to show that the expected national income E(y1) would be small in countries
with low A and low D even in the absence of a paradigm and foreign aid, i.e., even if
B = 0. Together with Proposition 2, this ﬁnding implies that development paradigms
have a natural tendency to fail because countries that would perform poorly anyway – due
to low productive capacity and poor political institutions – tend to follow the paradigms
more closely.
4 Adding Uncertainty
In the previous sections I have looked at a situation in which politicians know the policy z
that maximizes domestic production in the country-speciﬁc circumstances. In this section
I ﬁrst show that the main results of the previous section also hold if the politicians do
not know z, i.e., if they are ignorant. I then add the assumption that the development
paradigm x reveals some information about the distribution of z. I ﬁnd that in this case
countries with ignorant politicians follow the paradigm more closely than countries with
informed politicians.
I assume that policy z is drawn from the distribution H1(z) with probability γ 2 (0,1),
and from the distribution H2(z) with probability 1   γ, where H1(0) = H2(0) = 0 and
H1(1) = H2(1) = 1, and where the corresponding densities h1(z) and h2(z) are continuously
diﬀerentiable. Since I will again focus on the expected distance E(ja1   xj), I can assume
without loss of generality that the politicians learn z at the beginning of period two.
Suppose for now that when choosing policy bundle (a1,κ1), the incumbent has no
information about z other than probability γ and the distributions H1(z) and H2(z). From
10his perspective the distribution of z is thus H(z) = γH1(z) + (1   γ)H2(z), with density




e(at,κt) = Λ(κt) ˜ f(at) + g(atjx),
where ˜ f(at) 
∫ 1
0 f(atjz)h(z)dz is continuously diﬀerentiable, concave and hump-shaped
like f(atjz).9 Expected domestic production is maximized by the policy ˜ z that satisﬁes
˜ f′(˜ z) = 0.
The PBE of this modiﬁed game is the same as the PBE characterized in Proposition
1, except that the value of the threshold D′ may diﬀer because policies a0 and ac are
now deﬁned as aκt  argmaxat ye(at,κt). Similar as in Lemma 1, it can be shown that the
equilibrium policies a0 and ac are between ˜ z and x; that they are the closer to the paradigm
x, the higher B and the lower A is; and that ac is closer to x than a0. Consequently, the
results in Proposition 2 also hold in this modiﬁed game. Hence developing countries with
ignorant politicians also tend to follow the current paradigm x more closely if their political
institutions are weak and their productive capacity A low.
I now add the assumptions that z is drawn from H1(z), and that the paradigm is x = ˜ z1,
where ˜ z1 satisﬁes ˜ f′
1(˜ z1) = 0 with ˜ f1(at) 
∫ 1
0 f(atjz)h1(z)dz again being continuously
diﬀerentiable, concave and hump-shaped. These assumptions may represent a situation
in which donors have some knowledge about country-speciﬁc optimal polices and set the
paradigm to maximize expected production in the recipient country.
The fact that the paradigm x reveals the true distribution of z does not provide any
additional valuable information to an incumbent who is informed and knows the country-
speciﬁc optimal policy z. He therefore still chooses the policy a1 speciﬁed in Proposition
9Note that ˜ f′(at) =
∫ 1
0 f′(atjz)h(z)dz > 0 for at = 0 since f′(0jz) > ()0 for all z > ()0, that
˜ f′(at) < 0 for at = 1 since f′(1jz) < ()0 for all z < ()1, and that ˜ f′′(at) =
∫ 1
0 f′′(atjz)h(z)dz < 0 for
all at 2 [0;1] since f′′(atjz) < 0 for all at and z.
111, which generally diﬀers from x. However, if the incumbent is ignorant, then information
about the distribution of z is valuable for him. In particular, when x = ˜ z1, an ignorant
incumbent can simultaneously maximize expected domestic production and aid inﬂows by
choosing policy a1 = x. Hence, unlike an informed incumbent, an ignorant incumbent
follows the paradigm very closely (no matter whether he is good or bad). Therefore:
Proposition 3 Given x = ˜ z1, the expected distance E(ja1   xj) is lower if the incumbent
is ignorant than if he knows z.
There are two important diﬀerences between the results in Propositions 2 and 3. First,
low productive capacity A and weak political institutions D tend to lead to policies close
to the paradigm x independently of how the paradigm has been determined. Ignorance,
however, only causes incumbents to closely follow the paradigm if doing so increases ex-
pected domestic production. If the paradigm is set randomly, or if it reﬂects ideological
views, then it becomes ambiguous whether an informed or an ignorant incumbent follows
the paradigm more closely. Second, low productive capacity and weak political institutions
lead to policies close to the paradigm because such policies generate higher aid inﬂows. But
when the paradigm maximizes expected domestic production, ignorant politicians would
follow the paradigm more closely than informed politicians even if foreign aid were paid
independently of the chosen policy.
It is easy to show that countries with an ignorant incumbent would perform worse in
expectation than countries with an informed incumbent also in the absence of a paradigm
and foreign aid. Proposition 3 thus suggests another reason why paradigms may fail: they
may attract countries that would perform poorly anyway because of their incompetent
politicians. But despite their poor performance, these countries still perform better than if
the paradigm did not reveal any information about the appropriate policies z. A paradigm
that reveals valuable information therefore simultaneously helps countries with ignorant
politicians, and looks like a failure as most countries that follow it perform poorly.
125 Concluding Remarks
The presented model suggests that many developing countries may be willing to distort
their policies to follow a certain development paradigm in order to attract higher aid ﬂows.
The countries that are willing to distort their policies most are those with poor economic
and institutional pre-conditions, because their economies plagued by poor technologies and
corrupt and incompetent political leaders are unproductive anyway. Hence, development
paradigms may fail partly because most countries that follow them would fail anyway.
While my model can possibly best capture the two major development paradigms (with
their implications for the degree of government interventions), the main idea should apply
more generally. To get foreign aid, developing countries often need to meet “enormous
demands on scarce administrative skills” (Easterly, 2002, p. 223), or to channel resources
towards certain projects or initiatives. Countries may be more willing to meet such de-
mands if their opportunity costs are low because of low productivity, weak institutions or
rampant corruption.
The model suggests that development paradigms might retard development by mo-
tivating political leaders to distort their policies away from the policies that would be
appropriate in the country-speciﬁc circumstances. What might seem even worse is that
paradigms cause larger policy distortions in countries with low productivity and poor gov-
ernance. This, however, is not unambiguously negative, as it implies higher aid ﬂows to
countries in which the people’s welfare is low. Paradigms could thus be seen as a mecha-
nism, albeit imperfect, that ensures that more aid ﬂows to countries where people are in
need. In addition, paradigms can also do good when used to reveal valuable information
about appropriate policies to incompetent political leaders.
There is disagreement about what development paradigm, if any, has followed the
Washington Consensus (Rodrik, 2006). Some would say that the focus on governance
13and corruption is the new development paradigm. This focus is quite diﬀerent from the
policy paradigms discussed in this paper. Thinking within the presented framework, such
a paradigm may mean that foreign aid is independent of the chosen policy, but higher
when the policy is implemented in an honest rather than a corrupt manner. As a result
(good and bad) politicians have no incentive to distort policies, and even bad politicians
may often ﬁnd it optimal to implement these undistorted policies in an honest manner.
But, in countries with very poor political institutions, bad politicians may still engage in
massive corruption.10 As a result these countries receive less foreign aid. Hence, the eﬀects
of such a governance paradigm contrasts starkly with the eﬀects of policy paradigms: First,
countries where people are in need tend to receive more aid under a policy paradigm, but
less aid under a governance paradigm. Second, a governance paradigm may look successful
partly because its followers would perform quite well anyway, while policy paradigms tend
to look unsuccessful partly because they attract mainly countries that would fail anyway.
10Appendix B (not intended for publication) derives these results formally.
14Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: It follows from the properties of f(.) and g(.) that given κt, there
exist either one or two local maximizers, a
κt
l , of y(at,κt). Each of them must satisfy the
ﬁrst-order condition Λ(κt)f′(atjz) + g′(atjx) = 0. It follows from this ﬁrst-order condition
and the properties of f(.) and g(.) that minfx,zg  a
κt
l  maxfx,zg, and that ja
κt
l   xj
increases in Λ(κt) and decreases in B for both a
κt
l . Hence, if there is only one local
maximizer (which then coincides with the global maximizer aκt), it holds that jaκt   xj
increases in A and decreases in B, and that ja0 xj > jac xj. Moreover, it follows from the
strict concavity of f(.) and g(.) that if there are two local maximizers and the one closer to
z (to x) is the global maximizer for some value of
(κt)
B , then the local maximizer closer to
z (to x) is the global maximizer also for all higher (smaller) values of
(κt)
B . Consequently,
it holds that jaκt   xj increases in A and decreases in B, and that ja0   xj > jac   xj even
if there are two local maximizers. 
Proof of Lemma 2: As period two is the last period, a good politician maximizes w2
and a bad politician maximizes w2 +r2. A good politician prefers (a0,0) to (ac,c) because
y0 > yc and, consequently, w(a0,0) > w(ac,c). A bad politician prefers (ac,c) to (a0,0)




Proof of Proposition 1: I ﬁrst prove existence of the characterized PBE. It follows
from Lemma 2 that the good incumbent’s strategy is indeed his best response to the
people’s strategy, and from Lemma 2 and the discussion before the proposition that the
bad incumbent’s strategy is indeed his best response to the people’s strategy. Given these
strategies of the diﬀerent incumbent types, Bayesian updating implies µ(0) = 1 and µ(c) =
0 if D < D′, and µ(0) = β if D  D′. Moreover the Intuitive Criterion requires the oﬀ
equilibrium belief µ(c) = 0 if D  D′, because playing κ1 = c is in this case equilibrium
dominated for a good, but not for a bad incumbent. Consequently, the people’s strategy
15is optimal given their beliefs µ(κt) for D < D′ as well as for D  D′.
I now prove that no other PBE exists. It follows from the discussion before the propo-
sition that no other PBE can exist in which a good incumbent plays κ1 = 0. Hence it only
remains to be shown that no PBE can exist in which a good incumbent plays κ1 = c. In
any perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which a good incumbent plays κ1 = c, a bad incum-
bent plays κ1 = c as well. But the Intuitive Criterion then requires the oﬀ equilibrium
belief µ(0) = 1, because playing κ1 = 0 is equilibrium dominated for a bad, but not for a
good incumbent. Given µ(0) = 1, the people would support the incumbent when observing
κ1 = 0, and a good incumbent would therefore deviate and play κ1 = 0 instead of κ1 = c.
Hence there exists no PBE in which a good incumbent plays κ1 = τ.
I ﬁnally derive the properties of D′. It follows from y0 > yc > 0 and (τ + c)yc > τy0






∂I   yc ∂y0
∂I
]
for i 2 fA,B,ϕg. It follows from the deﬁnition of y(at,κt)




∂B , and it holds that y0 > yc > 0. Hence ∂D′
∂B > 0. The
deﬁnition of y(at,κt) further implies
∂yc
∂ϕ > 0 =
∂y0
∂ϕ . Hence ∂D′
∂ϕ > 0. Equation (1) implies
y0 ∂yc
∂A   yc ∂y0
∂A = B [ϕf(acjz)g(a0jx)   f(a0jz)g(acjx)], which is strictly negative because
Lemma 1 and the properties of f(.) and g(.) imply f(acjz)  f(a0jz) and g(a0jx)  g(acjx),
and because ϕ < 1. Hence ∂D′
∂A < 0. 
16Appendix B (not intended for publication)
In this appendix I assume that foreign aid no longer depends on policy at, but on corruption
κt. In particular, I assume that aid inﬂows are given by B˜ g(κt), with ˜ g(0) > ˜ g(c)  0. The
rest of the model is the same as in section 2.
In any period the politician in oﬃce simply chooses the policy at = z, which maximizes
national income yt and, thereby, his oﬃcial wage wt, and also the corruption revenues rt if
κt = c.11 Hence, it is only corruption κt 2 f0,cg that is of interest in this setting.
In period two a good incumbent again chooses κ2 = 0, which leads to the national
income y2 = ˜ y0  ˜ A + ˜ g(0), where ˜ A  Af(zjz). The payoﬀ of a bad incumbent is τ˜ y0
when choosing κ2 = 0, and (τ + c)˜ yc, where ˜ yc  ϕ ˜ A + ˜ g(c), when choosing κ2 = c. Hence
he prefers κ2 = 0 if τ
c 
ϕ ~ A+~ g(c)
(1−ϕ) ~ A+~ g(0)−~ g(c), and κ2 = c otherwise.12
The people’s decision at the end of period one matters if and only if τ
c <
ϕ ~ A+~ g(c)
(1−ϕ) ~ A+~ g(0)−~ g(c).
In this case the PBE of this modiﬁed game is the same as the PBE characterized in
Proposition 1, except that the threshold is now ˜ D′ 
(τ+c)~ yc−τ~ y0
(τ+c)~ yc < D′.13 The probability
that a country chooses κ1 = 0 is 1 if D  ˜ D′, and β otherwise. Hence countries with
high D are more likely to follow such a governance/corruption paradigm. But countries
with high D would also be more likely to choose κ1 = 0 than countries with low D in the
absence of foreign aid, i.e., if B = 0. The implications of these results are discussed in
section 5.
11In the presence of uncertainty as in section 4, the incumbent would choose the policy at that maximizes
expected national income, but all subsequent results would be very similar.
12Depending on ˜ g(0) and ˜ g(c), this inequality can hold even though τ
c <
ϕ
1−ϕ. Hence, even a bad
politician in oﬃce chooses 2 = 0 if ˜ g(0) is suﬃciently large relative to ˜ g(c).

















the inequality follows from Lemma 1, and because
~ g(0)
~ g(c) > 1 >
g(a
0|x)
g(ac|x), where the ﬁrst inequality holds by
assumption and the second follows from Lemma 1.
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